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Abstract Modelling is used to describe, explore and
predict changes in land use and other human systems.
‘Top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ modelling approaches are
both popular, and each has important philosophical impli-
cations that correspond closely to major debates in social
science. We outline some key contributions to these
debates and argue that social processes such as those
underlying land use decisions are fundamentally deter-
mined by individual intentionality, interacting with social
norms of language, culture and institutions, rather than by
general and predictable ‘laws’. Therefore, bottom-up
models that reflect these processes offer far more infor-
mative accounts of system development. However, pre-
diction remains outside the scope of either approach, and
methods of validation based on tests of historical predictive
ability risk over-fitting to trends and underestimating
uncertainties. We explore the implications of these argu-
ments for model design and use, and for general under-
standing of such fundamentally complex, spontaneously
evolving systems.
Keywords Bottom-up  Institutions  Prediction 
Socio-ecological system  Top-down  Validation
Introduction
Modelling is widely applied to land use and other human
activities to investigate the development of socio-ecologi-
cal systems. Such models provide experimental settings
that would otherwise be unavailable, and can produce
fundamental advances in our understanding of system
dynamics, sensitivities and uncertainties. Model results can
also influence the subsequent actions of individuals, soci-
eties and institutions. Therefore, socio-ecological systems
models have been used in diverse theoretical and applied
settings as tools of exploration or prediction, for purposes
of research, policy-making and practical land management
(Veldkamp and Lambin 2001; Agarwal et al. 2002; Milne
et al. 2009).
The achievement of a model’s purpose always depends
upon that model’s ability to represent relevant aspects of
the real-world system, and the extent to which the model
itself is understood (Hofstede 1980). As simplifications
designed to enhance understanding, models tread a fine line
between real-world relevance and counter-productive
complexity, especially as computing power increases
(Young et al. 1996; Batty and Torrens 2005; Lustick and
Miodownik 2009). However, determining the appropriate
level of complexity for any given model is a difficult—if
not intractable—problem. For complex systems models,
this determination requires far more than a choice of terms
to include, but also a choice between two fundamentally
different conceptualisations of the system in question; as a
coherent structural system in its own right or as an emer-
gent product of the actions and interactions of populations
of entities within the system (Batty and Torrens 2005;
Easterly 2008).
In many cases, models of land use take a ‘top-down’
(or ‘pattern-based’), reductionist approach that describes
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specific changes as consequences of system-wide (usually
economic) developments, encapsulating observational data
in the form of equations or algorithms. This approach is
well-established and allows for the application of suc-
cessful models across large geographical extents (Heister-
mann et al. 2006; van Meijl et al. 2006; Verburg et al.
2008; Verburg and Overmars 2009; Meiyappan et al.
2014). However, many other models take an alternative
‘bottom-up’ (or ‘process-based’) approach that focuses on
basic processes and entities and allows system-wide
developments to emerge from these, synthetically produc-
ing output data from local interactions. Such models are
increasingly used in land science to account for the actions
and interactions of individual land managers, populations,
institutions and societies in extracting desired goods and
services from their environment (Galvin et al. 2006; Mat-
thews et al. 2007; Milne et al. 2009).
Justifications have been offered for both approaches, and
for combinations of them, but the choice has generally
been seen as one of practicality (e.g. model and data
availability, computational feasibility) rather than as a
philosophical imperative. As a result, top-down models
(such as statistical, optimisation, equilibrium or other
equation-based models) dominate in continental to global
scale studies, and bottom-up models (such as agent-based,
multi-agent or cellular-automata) in sub-national scale
studies (Agarwal et al. 2002; Janssen and Ostrom 2006).
However, modelling practicalities are becoming less deci-
sive with advances in model design and calibration that
remove barriers, in particular, to bottom-up modelling over
large geographical areas, or to the incorporation of ele-
ments of both approaches within a single model (Arneth
et al. 2014; Rounsevell et al. 2013). As a result, several
instances of hybrid models exist, incorporating elements of
top-down and bottom-up approaches as appropriate to their
purpose (e.g. Verburg and Overmars 2009; Murray-Rust
et al. 2014).
We argue that the choice of modelling approach in land
use science is not arbitrary or incidental, but that it has
substantial implications for our understanding of the
modelled system. Furthermore, we suggest that there is a
philosophical imperative to account for the role of human
agency and intentionality in the development of the land
system. While top-down approaches can be useful heuristic
tools, they are unable to account for the true internal
dynamics of the system and so do not provide a reliable
basis for predicting, understanding or attempting to inter-
vene in system development. We make this argument on
the basis of established principles in philosophy and social
science that are highly relevant to land use modelling. We
outline some major contributions to relevant philosophical
debates, their interpretations in previous studies, and their
implications for the theory and practice of land use mod-
elling. Our intention is to contribute to an ongoing and
necessary discussion about the basis and purpose of land
use modelling.
The land use system as a social system
The use of the Earth’s land surface for the provision of
food and other goods and services is a major and per-
vasive form of human activity (Foley et al. 2005; Ellis
et al. 2010). Like other human activities, land use is
constrained by physical reality in the form of natural
resources and processes. However, this should not obscure
the fact that human interactions with naturally occurring
and man-made components of the material world are
products of their individual, social and institutional con-
text. Land use is governed by legal concepts of ownership
and entitlement, concepts of distributive justice, patterns
of authority, cultural, aesthetic and religious values and
individual decision-making. The potential changes in land
use as these conditions vary are myriad, reflecting com-
plex dynamics within and between social and environ-
mental systems (Hanna and Folke 1996; Ro¨ling 1997;
Ostrom et al. 1999; Ballet et al. 2007). Indeed, these
inter-relationships have motivated the development and
widespread adoption of socio-ecological systems theory
(e.g. Kinzig 2001; Redman et al. 2004; Galvin et al.
2006).
Land use models generally acknowledge the social
nature of land use, and many top-down and bottom-up
models explicitly seek to represent coherent socio-eco-
logical systems (e.g. Tallis and Kareiva 2006; Lacitignola
et al. 2007; Asselen and Verburg 2012). The basic dif-
ference between the approaches, then, lies not in their
understanding of the modelled system but in their treat-
ment of it—the description that they explicitly or
implicitly identify as most appropriate. In practice, this
identification is generally informal and strongly influ-
enced by the context and purpose of the modelling
exercise, and related factors that make one approach more
or less convenient or feasible than another. However, the
choice between approaches can never be fully reduced to
such factors, because fundamentally different conceptu-
alisations of system dynamics are involved, and both
cannot be equally valid. Furthermore, this choice has
important implications for the ways in which we under-
stand and interact with the modelled systems (e.g.
Shackley et al. 1998; Epstein 2008). These implications
are apparent in long-established but contrasting positions
in sociology, the social sciences generally and in the
philosophy of social science.
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Philosophical conceptualisations of social processes
The two dominant land use modelling approaches corre-
spond closely to foundational philosophical conceptuali-
sations of social processes. Top-down modelling, in its
encapsulation of system development in general equations
or rules, is fundamentally reductionist in nature, and is
consistent with similar approaches in social science such as
deterministic reductionism (Young et al. 1996; Hollis
2002; Batty and Torrens 2005). The most significant such
approach, positivism, originated in the post-Enlightenment
recognition of the immense potential of scientific inquiry to
predict the outcome of physical processes. This encouraged
belief in the power of observation to explain complexity
through reduction to a rigorous system of law-like princi-
ples. Social scientific positivism represents the claim that
similar methodological considerations apply in the expla-
nation of social phenomena (e.g. Comte 1852; Mill 1865;
Winch 1958; Durkheim 1982).
Top-down methodologies are also consistent with the-
oretical approaches that conceive social, psychological,
linguistic and economic systems in terms of fixed relations
between some constituent elements. A particularly
notable example is Karl Marx’s claim that the character-
istics of changing human cultures are determined by
underlying socio-economic forces, independent of human
will, ‘which can be determined with the precision of nat-
ural science’ (McLellan 2010, pp. 424–427). Although the
extent of Marx’s commitment to this reductionist and
determinist thesis is contested, his formulation remains a
stark example of an interpretation of social life in which
causality is identified with the law-like operations of large
scale, aggregate features, and not with the ideas, values and
motives of the individuals and groups who comprise a
society. In general, such interpretations are therefore
identified as structuralist or functionalist (e.g. Le´vi-Strauss
1963; Hollis 2002; Jakobson and Halle 2002).
However, much of the positivist optimism concerning
the relevance of natural science methodology to the
explanation of social phenomena has been displaced from
the 1950s onwards. Particularly decisive were several
major contributions that stressed the fundamental impor-
tance of human agency to the development of social sys-
tems. These represent particularly cogent parallels and
justifications for bottom-up modelling approaches.
The role of human agency in explaining social
phenomena
Movement away from positivist views in the social sci-
ences was stimulated by the highly influential argument of
the philosopher and sociologist Peter Winch that ‘the
notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts
which is logically incompatible with the kinds of expla-
nation offered in the natural sciences’ (Winch 1958, p. 72).
Crucially, in this view, the difference between these modes
of explanation is not one of degree, but of kind. This dis-
tinction is rooted in Wittgenstein’s ‘second revolution in
philosophy’ and his repudiation of the search for elemen-
tary propositions that could be laid against the objects that
comprise reality, like the ruler imagined in his Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1922). Instead,
Wittgenstein focused on the relationship of human thought
to reality, as mediated by language, with its ‘prodigious
diversity’ and internal criteria of intelligibility rooted
within ‘forms of life’. This relationship precluded the
general forms of understanding and action envisaged by
positivist approaches, because these would require an
impossible vantage point beyond language, or language-
dependent symbolisms, from which to determine the rela-
tionship of language to reality—and human actions
(Wittgenstein 1968).
Winch further argued that the social scientist is con-
fronted with rules, principles and ideas that are internally
related to particular forms of life and social practices, and
the interpretations of these rules by their constituent agents.
Social scientific explanation must therefore prioritise
human intentionality and the ‘subjectively intended’
meaning of actions, a requirement completely alien to
explanations in the natural sciences (Winch 1958). In our
own communities we assume a level of background
agreement which makes descriptions of behaviour appear
seductively transparent and self-evident. However, we have
no assurance that our understanding corresponds with what
is observed unless we are able to grasp the internal rules
and concepts as well as a wider social context that gives
them their meaning. This is why, despite some areas of
common understanding, it is possible to misinterpret the
intentions and behaviour of others quite radically. Conse-
quently, ‘social interaction can more profitably be com-
pared to the exchange of ideas in a conversation than to the
interaction of forces in a physical system’; a conceptuali-
sation incompatible with the idea of causation as employed
in the natural sciences (Winch 1958, p. 128; see also, e.g.
Maturana 1988).
Human decision-making is based upon alternative
courses of action implicit in the linguistic and conceptual
rules according to which those decisions are made (which
is not to rule out irrational decisions). These rules are
indicative rather than programmatic, a point made by
Searle where he argues that concepts like ‘money’ and
‘marriage’ are whatever people choose to regard as money
and marriage rather than anything that can be identified
objectively with physical or behavioural correlates. There
is no absolute criterion outside a particular mode of dis-
course or social practice of what constitutes an application
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or a breach of the rules (Searle 1984). These rules, more-
over, do not lead inexorably in one direction but are subject
to a potentially indefinite range of interpretations (e.g.
Wittgenstein 1968, pp. 80–81). This often undermines
attempts by social analysts or modellers to predict changes
in behaviour because of the obvious risk of mistaking
trends for causally determined relations at the aggregate
level:
‘‘…even given a specific set of initial conditions, one
will still not be able to predict the outcome to a
historical trend because the continuation or breaking
off of that trend involves human decisions which are
not determined by their antecedent conditions…the
point is that such trends are in part the outcome of the
intentions and decisions of their participants.’’
(Winch 1958, p. 93)
Popper makes a similar claim in his refutation of Hegel
and Marx; that the identification of regularities in human
affairs too readily encourages confusion between historical
or sociological ‘laws’ and trends; between conditional
scientific predictions in the physical sciences and the
unconditional prophecies of social theories that fail to
recognise the retrospective and a priori nature of detected
trends (Popper 1969a). There is absolutely no guarantee in
principle that a trend will continue beyond the point at
which it has been identified as a significant social
phenomenon.
The legacies of Wittgenstein and Winch: critical
realism
Wittgenstein and Winch have exercised profound influ-
ences within and beyond social science, many of which are
beyond the scope of our argument. However, the work of
‘critical realists’ or ‘critical social theorists’ is especially
relevant [e.g. Habermas’ theory of ‘communicative action’
(1984), Bhaskar’s ‘transcendental realism’ (2010) and
Giddens’ theory of ‘structuration’ (1976, 1984)]. Despite
their diversity, these theories share a tendency to impart
structure for the purpose of social scientific explanation; in
other words, an element of compromise between the clearly
contrasting approaches discussed above. A particularly
controversial example is Bhaskar’s conflation of ‘cause’ in
the natural sciences with that of ‘reason’ in the explanation
of human behaviour (Bhaskar 2010). Sayer follows Bhas-
kar in formulating an idea of cause that distinguishes it
from invariant relationships between distinct events under
specifiable conditions, proposing the alternative of poten-
tialities that may or may not be realized. In addition, he too
argues that human ‘reasons’ may also be ‘causes’ (Sayer
2000, pp. 110–111).
In fact, these positions do not necessarily violate the
basic distinction drawn by Winch between ‘causes’ in
natural science and ‘reasons’ in social science because the
structures they propose remain entirely subject to social
processes. Bhaskar, for example, subsumes ‘reason’ within
his metaphysical conception of a universal, non-determin-
istic causality. Similarly, Sayer’s argument may be inter-
preted as a play on the generality of the concept of
causation; the rhetorical point that ‘reasons’ are ‘causes’ in
contexts of purposive human behaviour. Behaviour
expressing beliefs, values and reasons indeed has its social
consequences, but the task remains of understanding them
as responses to criteria internal to the community of agents
in question. Indeed, Sayer concedes (in words that closely
echo Winch) that there are fundamental differences
between the external viewpoint of the natural sciences and
the internal one required for the explanation of human
behaviour (Sayer 2000, p. 110). Sayer acknowledges ‘the
strangeness of social science’ that is ‘perhaps clearest in
studies which exhaustively search for enduring regularities
in aspects of human behaviour which are manifestly sus-
ceptible to change…’—for example when, ‘…in the course
of an interview aimed at eliciting an objective account of
people’s views or experiences they are inadvertently led to
revise them as a result of having to reflect upon them,
thereby ‘distorting’ our results’ (Sayer 2000, pp. 252–253).
Of course, these arguments are not universally accepted
and indeed are potentially interpretable either as ‘post-
positivist’ justifications for top-down modelling or as
fundamental challenges to the very concept of causation in
human systems (e.g. Pattee 2012; Turner and Robbins
2008). Nevertheless, they retain a fundamental consistency
with Winch’s work, offering a difference in emphasis that
actually reinforces their shared philosophical underpin-
nings and implications for modelling. Failure to recognise
the centrality of individual intentionality may invalidate
the most scrupulously constructed models and vitiate their
predictions—indeed, these issues call into question any
attempt to model social systems predictively (see below).
However, the critical-realist emphasis on social structures
illustrates the need to go beyond the individual level and
consider the role of social interaction in shaping the
development of social systems.
Social interaction: methodological individualism
versus ontological individualism
While the individual-level case for bottom-up modelling is
clear in the philosophy of social science, it is also open to
misinterpretation. This is most true in its implications for
the nature of social interaction. At one extreme is the view
presented by Mill in his System of Logic:
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‘‘Men are not, when brought together, converted into
another kind of substance…Human beings in society
have no properties but those which are derived from,
and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of
individual man’’ (Mill 1900, p. 573).
However, interpretations of this kind fail to account for
the social nature of human beings, the essential contribu-
tion of traditions, institutions and social practices to indi-
vidual consciousness and agency. Instead, the centrality of
human intentionality merely implies that, while crucially
important, social relationships are not of a law-like,
deterministic character at either social or individual levels
but require interpretation in terms of their internal
meanings.
Therefore, emphasis on individual consciousness does
not minimise the role of large scale social institutions, but
rather portrays them as constellations of ideas, rules and
values arising from the interaction of beliefs and actions of
individual members of a society (Blumer 1969). As such,
institutions exercise profound influences over individual
actors, but are equally liable to change profoundly as a
result of intentional human agency in response to them; a
concept that does not exclude the uniquely creative role
that can be played by individuals living and working within
specific cultural traditions (as also argued, e.g. by Fuchs
et al. 2002 and debated in an economic context by, e.g.
Stigler and Becker 1977; Hodgson 2003; Bathelt and
Gluckler 2013).
Consequently, our argument does not imply ‘ontological
individualism’, the doctrine that all social phenomena are
ultimately and exhaustively reducible to the level of indi-
vidual motives and actions (e.g. Mill 1900, above), or ‘the
fallacy of overestimating the extent to which social prop-
erties depend on individual people’, as Epstein (2012)
characterizes it. Even this brief review should illustrate the
overstatement in Epstein’s claim that ‘ontological indi-
vidualism is typically taken as a truism in the philosophy of
social science, and is a background assumption of both
analytical and computational models in the social sciences’
(Epstein 2012, p8; also, e.g. O’Sullivan and Haklay 2000).
Winch, for instance, argues that the intelligibility of
beliefs, attitudes and expectations of individuals, ‘cannot
be explained in terms of the actions of any individual
persons’ and that ‘The ways of thinking embodied in
institutions govern the way the members of the societies
studied by the social scientist behave’ (Winch 1958,
pp. 127–128). The relationship is inherently iterative and
stochastic, and developments will depend on the next move
in the ‘conversation’, according to interpretations of the
relevant rules by the participating parties.
Popper advocates methodological individualism as a
means of avoiding confusion between abstract theoretical
models and the social behaviour they purport to describe
(e.g. Popper 1969b, pp. 89–99). He recommends that
models should be analyzed in terms of the attitudes,
expectations and relationships amongst individuals; in
other words, by preserving the sense that holistic inter-
pretations of social phenomena are heuristic in character.
He nevertheless defends methodological individualism
against the idea that these phenomena can be exhaustively
reduced to statements about the motives and actions of
individuals, a position he describes as ‘psychologism’ and
attributes to Mill ‘…Our actions cannot be explained
without reference to our social environment, to social
institutions and to their manner of functioning’. (Popper
1969b, p. 90)
Winch clarifies this issue. Social institutions are not
simply theoretical constructs that we employ to explain
human behaviour. Concepts like ‘marriage’, ‘war’ or
‘government’ are constitutive of our understanding of our
own society and belong essentially to our behaviour
(Winch 1958, p. 128) (this point perhaps applies even more
clearly to concepts like ‘blasphemy’, ‘heresy’ or ‘obscen-
ity’). Any coherent description of the behaviour of indi-
viduals is logically parasitic upon the socially mediated
concepts that determine its significance for the actors. As a
result, our understanding of human behavior depends upon
our ability to grasp the rules and principles that are internal
to particular social practices and ways of life. This is quite
different to the position of an uncommitted observer who
detects regularities in forms of behavior, because it requires
at least some degree of immersion, if only imaginatively, in
those practices and forms of life
Implications for land use modelling
Modelling approach
Top-down and bottom-up methodologies both have some
support in social theory, at least superficially. However, the
key question is whether they are to be viewed as purely
optional alternatives or whether there is a case for priori-
tising one over the other—and if so, under what circum-
stances and to what ends. The philosophical debates
outlined above have several clear implications for these
questions.
‘Bottom-up’ modelling
Perhaps most compellingly, the philosophical stances of
Wittgenstein, Winch and Popper suggest that understand-
ing, explanation and prediction in the study of social pro-
cesses in general must involve the analysis of the
behaviours and interactions of actors within the given
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system. The implication for modelling social processes,
including patterns of land use, is that the ‘bottom-up’
approach most closely fulfils this philosophical require-
ment. However, this fundamental and compelling justifi-
cation has rarely been used to motivate models of land use
change. Indeed, very few models operate according to any
explicit theory; something that has previously been noted
and has prompted attempts to suggest unified or coherent
frameworks (e.g. Turner and Robbins 2008; Hersperger
et al. 2010; Schlu¨ter et al. 2014). Consequently, social
systems models have been characterised as ‘arbitrary,
poorly comparable, competent in highly specific domains
of knowledge and disarmingly inapt in any other’ (Conte
and Paolucci 2014, p. 4).
Of course, the more abstract and general argument that it
is necessary to account for behavioural and social pro-
cesses is frequently made, and has helped to drive the
development and adoption of computational techniques
such as agent-based modelling (e.g. Matthews et al. 2007;
Clifford 2008). Furthermore, a wide range of particular
philosophical issues have been discussed at the interface of
social and computational sciences (e.g. Axelrod 1997;
Macy and Willer 2002; Miller and Page 2009; Chattoe-
Brown 2013), and at the interface of these with geo-
graphical science (e.g. Batty 2005; Clifford 2008; O’Sul-
livan 2008; Turner and Robbins 2008; Torrens 2010).
Considerable literature also exists on the interpretation of
theory in methodological terms, whether for specific con-
texts (e.g. Parunak et al. 1998; Cecconi et al. 2010) or with
respect to problems such as model application over large
systems or geographical extents (e.g. Cioffi-Revilla 2002;
Paolucci et al. 2012; Binder et al. 2013; Rounsevell et al.
2013).
However, we suggest that two aspects of the philo-
sophical debates outlined above have not been sufficiently
considered in land use modelling: their fundamental, gen-
eral nature, requiring some consideration to be given to
them across the spectrum of land system models, and their
practical (as opposed to philosophical or technical) impli-
cations for model design. In the first case, we contend that,
at a very basic level, the bottom-up approach is better able
to uncover the true dynamics of social systems, which may
indeed be actively obscured by top-down approaches that
‘confuse order arising from complexity with rational order’
and that have therefore ‘ignored [such order] and adopted
methods that exclude it’ (Goldspink 2000, 1.4). Individual,
social and institutional behaviours, and their effects, are
linked (emergent) facets of one another, and bottom-up
approaches are uniquely well-placed to describe the co-
evolution of these (Ro¨ling 1997; Batty and Torrens 2005;
Helbing et al. 2011).
In a practical sense, though, it is clear that bottom-up
modelling has not yet fulfilled this potential. Instead,
models have tended to converge on narrow, minimalistic
interpretations, leaving important facets of human beha-
viour unexplored (e.g. Antunes and Coelho 2004; Helbing
and Balietti 2011; Conte and Paolucci 2014). This is cer-
tainly true when individual behaviour is prioritised at the
expense of social behaviour, or when social behaviour does
not have the ‘downward’ effects that are highlighted so
prominently in social theory (O’Sullivan and Haklay 2000;
Gilbert 2002; Sawyer 2000; Conte et al. 2013). Perhaps
most fundamentally, bottom-up models have been criti-
cised for their lack of attention to cognitive accuracy,
focusing on behavioural effects rather than generative
behavioural processes (Conte and Paolucci 2014; Dignum
et al. 2010). This not only renders models inapplicable in
novel circumstances (such as those to be encountered by
future societies), but dissolves the principal distinction
between top-down and bottom-up approaches.
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the sig-
nificance of these criticisms. While there can never be a
strict isomorphism at a fundamental level between model
algorithms and the forms of behaviour that are the subjects
of examination, improved descriptions remain technically
feasible. Furthermore, the basic philosophical case outlined
above remains strong, and indeed encourages the necessary
links between social scientific theory and modelling prac-
tice. There is an obvious need and opportunity for models
to build upon and reflect the ranges of behaviours exhibited
by relevant populations, while forgoing any temptation to
embed them in a deterministic, ‘top down’ account of
social processes (or, for that matter, a deterministic ‘bot-
tom-up’ account).
Top-down modelling
Notwithstanding the strong, general case for bottom-up
modelling, it is clear that bottom-up accounts are not
comprehensive, accurate or sufficient in all cases, and that
top-down approaches do have a substantial and legitimate
role to play. The investigation of macro-level social phe-
nomena is an important stage in reaching an understanding
of social processes and can satisfy ‘a well-motivated pos-
itive need for functional abstraction and for relational
explanation in terms of typical causal role’, as well as
focusing attention on the ‘downward’ element of social
interactions (Meyering 2000, p. 189). In other words, ‘top-
down’ models should be recognised and valued explicitly
as heuristic and provisional in character rather than deter-
ministic descriptions of causative effects.
For instance, recent work on the effects of economic
inequality found strong correlations with a comprehensive
range of macro-scale social phenomena such as life
expectancy, infant mortality, mental illness, obesity and
crime levels (Wilkinson and Pickett 2011). It is intuitively
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obvious that the vast majority of individuals could not be
reacting directly to comparative income and wealth dif-
ferentials; instead it has been suggested that inequality
creates social divisiveness, anxiety and feelings of inferi-
ority, leading to ill-health and social dysfunction (ibid.,
Layte 2011). This indicates enormous scope for further
research at the level of actors within the system in terms of
subjective perceptions and understandings of these phe-
nomena. Such insights are common to top-down analyses
of all social systems. In the context of land use change,
macro-scale relationships between economic or population
growth and agricultural expansion or intensification may
result from complex behavioural, social and institutional
interactions rather than any direct causation, but never-
theless suggest specific, promising foci for further research
(Lambin et al. 2001; Castella et al. 2005). Similarly,
attempts to ‘socialise the pixel’ by working backwards
from aggregate properties to underlying social processes
(e.g. Geoghegan et al. 1998) do not identify causative
effects but can illuminate underlying processes producing
observed trends.
Notwithstanding the importance of such contributions,
top-down analyses must be conducted with care. Even
where explicitly treated as descriptions of correlations
rather than causative factors, they may be erroneously
interpreted as explanations of reality. Models are seduc-
tively easy to view as ‘reductionist propositions
[that]…consist in expressing the phenomenon to be
explained in more fundamental terms’ (Maturana 1988).
This kind of interpretation is particularly appealing to
policy-makers who wish to avoid the complex, value-
based nature of governance decisions (Lyons 2005), and is
apparent in the development of misleadingly prescriptive
‘one size fits all’ governance strategies (Ballet et al. 2007;
Pannell 2008; Kenward et al. 2011). Any given approach
to modelling complex systems contains within it
assumptions, often hidden, about the basic dynamics of
these systems, and the consequences of these assumptions
for understanding and management need to be carefully
considered. Indeed, top-down assumptions about (a lack
of) meaningful individual and social behaviour risk
severely limiting the value of the models produced: ‘the
potential cost of simplification is irrelevance’ (Chattoe-
Brown 2013, p. 3.3).
Prediction
One of the strongest implications of the philosophical
arguments outlined above concerns predictive modelling. It
is widely recognised that prediction is, at best, just one of
many possible uses of models of social systems (e.g.
Epstein 2008). Nevertheless, it remains one of the most
commonly anticipated results of modelling exercises. Even
where more nuanced objectives such as ‘projection’ are
identified, scope for confusion in presentation and inter-
pretation often persists (e.g. Lo´pez et al. 2001; Veldkamp
and Lambin 2001; Wu et al. 2006; Sohl et al. 2007;
Pocewicz et al. 2008).
Explicit or implicit claims for predictive ability are
made most often on behalf of top-down models based on
statistical trends, correlations or other ostensibly positive
features. Such claims are alluring for the same reasons that
they are misleading—they relate to the identification of
clear, strong relationships that appear consistent across
time and which are therefore extrapolated into the future.
Statistically, this is inappropriate and unreliable, but it is
also a fundamentally unsafe approach to modelling social
systems. Both Winch and Popper highlight the potential for
social behaviour to depart radically from precedent for
reasons that may be expressed and understood differently,
if at all, by the actors involved. In some circumstances
changes of global significance may be almost entirely
unanticipated by expert and ostensibly well-informed
observers despite a wealth of empirical data concerning the
systems under investigation.
Several dramatic examples of such predictive failures
exist. Recently, the global financial crash exposed weak-
nesses in established economic models that portrayed
market economies as dynamically stable in the absence of
external interventions (Stiglitz 2000). It is possible to
interpret the failure of such models as resulting from an
incorrect interpretation of available data, but a more fun-
damental critique relates to their deterministic approach to
those data. John Maynard Keynes referred to the ‘uncon-
trollable and disobedient psychology of the business world’
contaminating the alleged law-like dynamics of market
economies (Keynes 1964, p. 317). But his formal refutation
of classical economic doctrine identified unpredictability as
an inherent feature of market economies. Decision-making
within a monetary system is invariably contingent on fac-
tors like the (potentially flawed) anticipation of future
trends in demand and prices for capital and consumer
goods, as well as the effects of new forms of competition
and the vagaries of consumer preference.
A similar problem has been identified by some com-
mentators in treatments of political systems. The collapse
of the Soviet Union took western observers (including
academics and intelligence agencies) by surprise, not
because of any lack of detailed information about the
system, but because the analytical framework within which
it was conceptualised involved the application of a priori
concepts of system-level relations. In this case, the
framework was based on attempts to define totalitarianism
in value-neutral terms that treated the USSR as a uniquely
inflexible, monolithic social, economic and political system
(Arendt 1962; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965). As the
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leader of a team of CIA analysts studying the Soviet Union
argued:
‘‘It seems likely that ultimately the reason for the
failure of professionals to understand the Soviet
predicament lay in their indifference to the human
factor. In the desire to emulate the successes of the
natural scientists, whose judgments are ‘‘value free,’’
politology (sic) and sociology have been progres-
sively dehumanized, constructing models and relying
on statistics (many of them falsified) and, in the
process, losing contact with the subject of their
inquiries—the messy, contradictory, unpre-
dictable homo sapiens.’’ (Cited by Jones and Sil-
berzahn 2013, pp. 125–126).
This analysis could equally apply to top-down models of
land use that describe the system as one comprised of
homogeneous and rational economic agents. Such models
are unable to anticipate the impacts of events such as the
Soviet collapse both because they share the above inter-
pretations of the political and economic systems that sup-
port human land use, and because they adopt a parallel
interpretation of the land use system itself. Sudden transi-
tions or ‘regime-shifts’ in land use are equally dependent
on the basic processes at play rather than system-level
properties, and their anticipation therefore depends upon
knowledge of behavioural, social and other micro-scale
factors (Weisbuch 2000; Lambin et al. 2001; Castella et al.
2005; Lambin and Meyfroidt 2010).
This is not to claim that intentionalistic interpretations
could be infallible guides to such events or to social trends
more generally (e.g. Jennings 2000; Kontorovich 2001). As
argued above, human behaviour is governed exhaustively
by the human intentions, values and conventions embedded
in different social institutions and practices—irrespective
of whether the resulting actions are rational, correct or self-
consistent. Indeed, the philosophical arguments we have
outlined call into question the very idea of causation in
social systems (Pattee 2012; Hulswit 2006). This represents
an insurmountable obstacle to infallible prediction under
any approach. Nevertheless, informed and sensitive anal-
ysis of diverse human motivations rather than reliance on
macro-scale predictive models should alert us more effec-
tively to prospective ‘tipping points’.
Model validation and use
The lack of predictability in social systems is not only a
problem for predictive modelling, but also for model val-
idation. Generally, and especially in the case of top-down
models, validation involves the assessment of agreement
between model results (predictions) and historical data. If a
model is able to reproduce observed changes consistently,
its design and parameterisation are regarded as valid.
Conversely, if a model predicts changes that are not
observed, it is regarded as faulty.
In fact, any model of a social system that reliably
reproduces an historical outcome should be evaluated
sceptically as probably over-fitted to particular data or
trends (Batty and Torrens 2005). This is especially perti-
nent in the context of future conditions or scenarios that
have no observable historical precedent. In any case, as
argued above, there is nothing inevitable about the results
of social processes, and an observed outcome is only one
among a wide range of possible outcomes. Complete
inability to reproduce such an outcome should call model
validity into question, but so should inability to produce
numerous and potentially radically different counter-fac-
tual results. Similar issues relate to the otherwise legitimate
use of spatial or system analogues, in which processes
similar to those modelled occur in different geographical
locations or systems rather than times: these extend the
scope for comparing model results to observations, but
involve the same risk of over-fitting to a particular
outcome.
Instead, there is a clear case for validation to focus on
modelled processes rather than highly variable and unpre-
dictable emergent outcomes (e.g. McCarl and Apland
1986; Batty and Torrens 2005). However, measuring pro-
cess accuracy is no easy task, and bottom-up models have
many specific problems of validation that increase with the
complexity of behaviour included. This is especially true
where attempts are made to validate process and pattern
concurrently, without accounting for the non-unique and
potentially confounding relationships between the two (as
also applies when assumptions of general equilibrium and
actor rationality are considered validated because models
containing them reproduce observed patterns) (Windrum
et al. 2007). A number of approaches have been suggested
to account for these difficulties (e.g. Werker and Brenner
2004; Windrum et al. 2007), but it must also be appreciated
that models of human and natural systems are at some level
impossible to validate, because systems are never closed or
static, and quantitative characteristics can never uniquely
identify a cause (e.g. Oreskes et al. 1994; Schindler and
Hilborn 2015).
Given the impossibility of strict validation, a more open
process assessing model performance or ‘robustness’ may
be preferable (Berger 2001). Such a process should involve
extended, iterative periods of calibration and exploration of
uncertainty (Batty and Torrens 2005; Troost and Berger
2014). Indeed, given the various purposes of social theories
and models that are entirely distinct from prediction (e.g.
Epstein 2008), validation of this kind may be an end in
itself. In generating ranges of possible outcomes rather than
reproducing historical observations, models explore the
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‘noise’ in social systems and substantially increase our
understanding of those systems (Edmonds 2000; Lustick
and Miodownik 2009). This is particularly relevant given
the considerable potential identified above for incorporat-
ing more social theories and cognitive richness into bot-
tom-up models.
While the philosophical imperative for process-based
understanding is clear, its practical implementation is
therefore considerably more complex and more dependent
on specific circumstances. The increasing use of bottom-up
(especially agent-based) models of land use change mirrors
the earlier move away from positivism in social science.
However, no model can accurately and completely describe
a social system, and model validation and use must
therefore focus on particular aspects of that system, while
carefully recognising shortcomings and omissions. Of
particular relevance is the impossibility of defining system
boundaries, which, like the behaviours and relationships
within the system, are fundamentally fluid and non-algo-
rithmic (e.g. Epstein 2012). Uncertainty is an inherent
property of social systems, and models are particularly
useful for allowing controlled—if artificial—experiments
that explore such uncertainty (Young et al. 1996; Janssen
and Ostrom 2006; Lustick and Miodownik 2009; Brown
et al. 2014). This may be best achieved through the com-
plementary stages of analysis identified above, with top-
down approaches used to identify broad relationships of
interest, and bottom-up approaches used to investigate
processes responsible for those relationships. Such an
approach rests on firm philosophical foundations and so
maximises our ability to understand the past and future
development of systems such as human land use.
Conclusions
The land use system is fundamentally a social system, the
development of which is determined by individual beha-
viours, conceptions and decisions, together with interac-
tions with emergent social and institutional structures. This
non-deterministic system is not predictable and consider-
able scope exists for predictive models to mislead about
possible future developments. Nevertheless, models remain
highly valuable heuristic and exploratory tools that can
substantially improve our understanding of the land system
and its interactions with other human and natural systems.
These points are especially pertinent in the context of
global climatic, social and demographic changes. It is
likely that many of these changes will be sudden and/or
extreme, without any available historical parallels, ren-
dering models that are closely based (calibrated or vali-
dated) on historical data obsolete. This is especially true for
models that either neglect or constrain behaviour, as
individual land managers, institutions and societies may
respond to these changes in quite different ways.
In these circumstances, recognition of the central role of
human intentionality in land use change is imperative.
Bottom-up, process-based models are uniquely well-placed
to achieve this, according closely with some of the central
arguments in the philosophy of social science. Such
approaches allow for more accurate, rigorous and explicit
treatment of the system and its inevitable uncertainties, and
therefore can substantially improve our understanding of
system development. This is most (or, perhaps, only) true
where an exploratory approach that builds on the insights
of social science is taken to modelling, with top-down
models utilised appropriately to investigate macro-scale
trends and relationships for further analysis with bottom-up
models.
These conclusions have clear implication for the prac-
tice of land use modelling. Models should be designed in
ways that are appropriate to their objectives, with bottom-
up designs used to investigate hypothesised causal rela-
tionships and potential future developments. Validation
should not restrict models to reproduction of historical
changes, but should focus on process accuracy and
assessment of ranges of results. The crucial role of dynamic
interactions across levels of social organisation, from
individual to formal institutional levels, should be
accounted for. Finally, models should be used to highlight
and explore uncertainties, so that practical and political
decision-making can respect the fundamentally complex,
social nature of the system it seeks to alter.
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